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INTRODUCTION
To assert that artificial light is ai- essential of
life would be to exalt its importance, yet it nay be justly
regarded as a necessity of modern civilization. Gas and
electricity are generally used for liE1gting purposes in all
large towns and cities, and as it is practically impossible
for the ordinary individual to economically manufacture the
gas or electricity which he requires, the business naturally
Is in the hands of companies which, owning extensive estab-
lishments, supply tre wants of all citizens. To distribute
the gas or electricity from the place of manufacture or gen-
eration to the various places of consumption requires the use
of the public streets. It is this use of the streets that
will be briefly discussed in the following pages. No new
principles of law have been evolved in the efforts of courts
to define the rights and liabilities of gas and electric com-
panies in the premises, but familiar rules have been fitted
and applied to novel conditions. Hence any extended examina-
tion of settled principles would be a work of unprofitable
supererogation, but an attempt will be made to illustrate the
manner in which those principles have been applied to the
subject.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF STREETS.
The legislature as representative of and trustee
for all the people, has full control over the streets, and
consequently may authorize acts to be done therein whicn would
otherwise be nuisances. In the absence of constitutional rea-
trictions the power of the legislature in this respect is
practically unlimited. One of the salutary restraints upon
legislative power, comnon to all of our sta~es, is that pri-
vate property shall not be taken except upon compensation be-
ing made to the owner. So while additional uses of streets
may be authorized which do not subvert or substantially im-
pair the original uses, yet the righ;t of the abutting lot
owner to enjoy the street as a means of access to his proper-
ty cannot be materially abridged without compensation being
(a)
made for the deprivation.
The abutting lot owner has peculiar rights in the
street which are not common to the public generally, embrac-
ing the right of free access to his premises, and the free
admission and circulation of light and air to and through his
property. If these rights are taken away or impaired the
abutter is entitled to such damages as !he may have sustained
by reason of the diversion of the street from the uses for
which it was originally taken or dedicated, and its appro-
(b)
priation to other and inconsistent uses.
(a) Story v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Mahady v.
Bushwick Ry. Co., 91 N. Y. 148; Branahan v. Hotel Co.,
39 Oh. St. 333.
(b) Lahr v. Metropolitan El. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 291.
Thei primary purpose of a street is for the passage
of the public, and all inconsistent uses must be exercised in
(a)
subordination of the original design and purpose. No person
can acquire a right to make a special or exceptional use of a
public street not common to all citizens of the state, except
by grant from the sovereign power. Thus the right to use
streets for the purpose of laying gas pipes therein or erect-
ing electric light poles and wires thereon, is a right which
can only be conferred by the legislature, either directly or
(b)
indirectly. If a company uses the streets for these purposes
(c)
without a legislative grant it is guilty of a nuisance, and
subject to indictment, and also liable to the adjoining lot
owner and all others who sustain Special damages.
The state by granting a franchise to erect poles or
lay pipes in streets does not abdicate its control over the
streets, or curtail its police powers, nor does the state ab-
solve itself from its primary duty to maintain the streets in
a safe and proper condition for public travel and other nec-
(ci)
essary street uses.
(a) Hudson River Telephone Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike & Ry.
Co., 135 N. Y. 393; People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593.
(b) Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq. 242; State v.
Cincinnati G. L. & C. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Norwich G. L.
Co. v. Norwich City G. Co., 25 Conn. 19; Domestic Tele-
graph Co., v. Newark, 49 N. J., Law 344.
(c) Norwich G. L. Co. v. Norwich City G. Co. supra; Common-
wealth v. Boston, 97 Mass. 553; Young v. Yarmouth, 9 Gray
386.
(d) American Rapid Telegraph Co. v. Hess et al, 125 N. Y.
641; People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593; Roanoke Gas Co. v.
City of Roanoke, 88 Va. 810, 14 S. E. 665.
FRANCHISES GRANTED BY CITIES.
"As the highways of a state, including streets in
cities, are under the paramount and primary control of the
legislature, and as all municipal powers are derived from the
legislature, it followis that the authority of municipalities
over streets and the uses to which they may be put depends
entirely upon their charters or the legislative enactments
applicable to them. It is usual in this country for the leg-
islature to confer upon municipal corporations very extensive
powers in respect to streets and public ways within their
(a)
limits and the uses to which they may be appropriated." The
wisdom of delegating the control of the streets to the munici-
pality is obvious, as the municipality is in a better posi-
tion to understand the improvements needed, the safeguards
(b)
required, and the exigencies to be encountered, but the dele-.
gation must plainly appear by express grant or necessary im-
(c)
plication.
The legislature may grant the municipality most ex-
tensive powers, making it a minature state within its local-
A
ity, or it may deprive it of every power, leaving it a cor-
(d)
poration in name only.
Where the legislature has delegated the control and
regulation of streets to a municipality, the latter may law-
fully permit any use of the streets which is consistent with
the objects for which they are held, and may grant the privi-
(a) Dillon, II Mun. Corp., Sec. 680.
(b) People v. Mut. G. L. Co., 38 Mich. 154.
(c) Domestic Telegraph Co. v. Newark, 49 N. J. Law 344.
(d) Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 545.
(a)
lege of laying gas pipes and mains therein, but the munici-
pality has power to grant the privilege only so far as the (b)
sovereign power has referred the matter to it for its consent.
As the legislature, representing the public, may, as we have
seen, restrict the public use of a street, it may confer pow-
er upon a municipality to authorize the erection of electric
light poles and the stringing of wires in the streets within
its limits, and this power may be inferred from the power to
(c)
regulate and control the streets. Whether this power may be
validly exercised without making compensation to the abutting
owner is a matter upon which various views are entertained,
and its determination depends upon the question of whether or
not the erection of poles in the streets is considered as
(d)
consistent with street uses.
As a municipality may only exercise such powers as
(e)
are conferred upon it by the legislature, a grant of the
right to erect poles and wires or lay pipes in the streets is
(f)
void, without legislative authority; nor can any rights spring
from such grant because the city authorities acquiesce in the
(g)
use of the streets, and money is expended on faith of the
grant, for a city is a trustee of the streets for known spec-
(a) Chicago Municipal G. L. Co. v. Town of Lake, 130 Ill. 42.
(b) City of Brooklyn v. Jourdan, 7 Abb. N. C. 231.
(c) 77. U. T. Co. v. G. & S. El. L. Co., 46 Mo. App. 120.
(d) See "Electric Light Poles Additional Servitude", p 27,in-
fra; Metropolitan Telephone & Telegraph Co., v. Colwell
Lead Co., 67 How. Pr. 365; W. U. T. Co. v. G. & S. E. L.
Co., supra.
(e) Richmond G. L. Co. v. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 232.
(f) Brush E. L. Co. v. Jones Bros. E. L. Co., 5 Ohio Cir. Ct.
Rep. 340; Raneberry v. Keller, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 299.
(g) Brush etc. Co. v. Jones Bros. etc. Co., supra.
ific uses, and a company dealing with it is bound to take (a)
notice of its power to alien or encumber the trust property.
Where a city has the power under its charter to
construct and maintain gas works, it may contract with1 others
(b)
to supply gas, and the implication seems reasonable that it
may by contract give the gas company the right to lay its Cc)
pipes in the streets and keep them there for a number of years
The fact that the general statutes under which a
gas company was organized authorize corporations formed there-
under to exercise all the powers necessary to carry into ef-
fect the objects for which they are created will not empower
the company to lay pipes in the streets of a town whose char-
ter gives the town authorities the power to control and regu-
(d)
late the streets without the consent of such authorities.
Where the location of poles is left to the discretion of the
city authorities, the courts will not interfere to compel
them to designate locations upon their refusal to act. And
where a company has not received a necessary permission to
use the streets for the purpose of stringing its wires, it
cannot evade the statutes by selling or giving the wires in
(f)
the streets to its consumers.
LAMP POSTS:-
Where a city has control over its streets it may
(a) Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 97.
(b) City of Newport v. Newport L. Co., 84 Ky. 166.
(c) City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 875.
(d)Chicago M. G. L. & F. Co. v. Town of Lake, 130 Ill. 42.
(e) Suburban L. & P. Co. v. Boston, 153 Mass. 200.
(f) Atty. Gen. v. Walworth L. & P. Co., 157 Mass. 86.
permit the erection of lamp posts at suitable places for the
purpose of lighting the same at night, as this is a use per-
fectly consistent with the public easement. The streets are
thus rendered more safe and passable at night, and the public
(a)
convenience subserved. But the right to lay and maintain gas
pipes does not carry with it as a necessary incident the
(b)
right to erect and maintain Lamp posts at the street corners.
QUASI PUBLIC CHARACTER.
GAS C 0OMPANIES :-
The manufacture and distribution of illuminating
gas by means of pipes laid in the public streets may be con-
sidered as a business of a public character, and the use of
the streets as a franchise emanating from the state. The
franchise is conferred for the benefit of the public as -ell(c)
as of the company. The company owes duties to the public and
it cannot sell, assign, or lease its privileges without con-
(d)
sent of the legislature, nor will a court of equity compel
specific perfornance of a contract whereby a gas company
agrees to abandon the discharge of its duties to the public
and not thereafter engage in business in a certain portion of
(e)
a city. Yet it does not serve such a public use as to exempt
(f)
it from the exercise of the right of eminent domain. However,
(a) Roche v. Milwaukee G. L. Co., 5 Wis. 55.
(b) New Orleans G. Co. v. Hart, 4 So. (La.) 215.
(c) Chicago G. L. & C. Co. v. Peoples etc. Co., 121 Ill. 530.
City of Zanesville v. Zanesville G. L. Co., 47 Ohio St. 1.
(d) Bath G. L. Co. v. Claffy, 747un.638.
Brunswick G. L. Co. v. United etc. Co., 85 Me. 432.
(e) Chicago G. L. & C. Co. v. Peoples etc. Co., 1_1 Ill. 530.
(f) N. Y. C. etc. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan G. L. Co., 63 N. Y
326.
it has been held by other court's t.at ,as companies are not
quasi public in their nature, where they are under no obliga-
tion to :)..-a(,ture or sell gas, and where no public duties
(a)
are imposed upon them. The business Is not regarded as a
prerogative of the state, but is open to all, an da: be car-
(b)
riled cn by any person without legislative auto-it:r.
IATUP&L GAS COPATIIES : -
Thc business of companies incorporated for the pur-
pose of conducting and supplyiUy natural -as is generally
considered as a business i!-volving public duties and benefits
sufficient to justify under statute the exercise of the right
(c)
of public domain in their behalf.
ELECTRIC LIGIiT C0TPIANIES:-
Electric light companies vre quast public corpora-
tions being engaged in a business involving public duties andid)
obligations.
ASSIGI1ENIIT OF FRANCHISE.
The power of a ccm! or"a to assign its franchise to
use the streets will not frequently arise for ceotermination,
inasmuch as such g'arts are usualy: made to include "success-
ors and assigns". But in t-e absec e of words conferripo a
rigcht of alienation, the permission of a city to a gas comrnIavy
(a) Comnoruez1t1 v. Lo,'ell G. L. Co., 12 Allen 75.
(b) Jersey City G. Co. v. lw:ight, 29 N. J. Eq. 24-2.
(c) B. & R. Nat. G. L. Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437.
Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. A4 6.
(d) Edison United Mf. Co. v. Far-,ington etc. Co., 82 Me. 464.
Scranton v. Scranton Electric etc. Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep.
626.
Liaster v. Ediso' El. I] . Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 631.
9to lay pipes in the streets is not such a negotiable right asKa)
the company may assign without city's consent. A receiver of
a company, however, succeeds to its rights, and may proceed
(b)
under the consent given to the company. But if the legisla-
ture has granted the right to lay pipes subject to the con-
sent of the city and that consent has been obtained, the com-
pany becomes vested with a right to use the streets as a
franchise conferred by the state, and may mortgage it. If
the mortgagee foreclose ,the franchise, he may organize a new
company and enter upon the enjoyment of the franchise without
(c)
farther permission from the city. For the power to mortgage
rights, privileges and franchises, ir order to make it avail-
able, and to render the security valuablevests the mortgagee
with power to foreclose. Consequently, a purchaser at a
foreclosure sale acquires the rights and privileges of the
original company, subject, of course, to the same terms and
conditions. And upon such foreclosure the municipality has
(d)
no authority to forfeit the rights of the mortgagee.
EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES.
MONOPOLIES:-
Monopolies are favorites neither with the courts
(a) City of Brooklyn v. Fulton etc. Co., 7 Abb. N. C. 19.
(b) City/ of Brooklyn v. Jourdan, 7 Abb. N. C. 23.
(c) City of Brooklyn v. Jour'an, supra.
(d) City of Detroit v. Mutual G. Co. & Mutual G. L. Co.,
43 Mich. 594.
I0
nor the people. They are regarded as encroachments upon the
people's rights, as iniquitous eingines of extortion, and as
clogs upon the wheels of commerce. Especially repugnant to
republican sentiments, their creation is not uncommonly pro-
hibited by State Constitutions. In the absence of such pro-
hibit.lon, however, the legislature has the power to confer
exclusive pr1vileges *Wgas and electric companies to use the
streets for their respective purposes, which grants are valid
and will be upheld by the courts. The inherent nature of
these privileges is such that they cannot be shared by all,
and the grant abridges no right of the individual. These
privileges confer upon one the right to do that which before
no one had a right to do. Timid capital may be thus induced
to invest in undertakings of doubtful profit, and the public
comfort and convenience be subserved. But exclusive rights
should be granted with caution, especially when streets have
sufficient width and capacity to accommodate more than one
(a)
public enterprise without unduly obstructing public travel,
for competit4on is potent in securing the people from exaction.
The exclusive privilege, where the State Constitu-
tion does not prohibit, may be granted by the legislature,
(b)
either directly or indirectly, through the municipality. It
is for the legislature to decide, whether the privilege shall
(c)
be exclusive or not.
(a) Consol. E. L. Co. v. Peoples E. etc. Co., 94 Ala. 372.
(b) State v. Cin. G. L. & C. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; State v.
Mil. G. L. Co., 29 Wis. 454; People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24.
(c) California State Tel. Co. v. Alta Tel. Co., 22 Cal. 378.
Atty. Gen. v. Walworth L. & P. Co., 157 Mass. 86.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has sustained
grants of exclusive privilege on the ground that they are
made in consideration of money to be expended, and important
services to be rendered for the promotion of public comfort,
health and safety, and upon the same principle that a state
can grant an exclusive privilege to construct a railroad, to
(a)
maintain a bridge, or to operate a ferry. Nor is such grant
in conflict with a constitutional provision "that no men, or
set of men, are entitled to exclusive, separate public emolu-
ments or privileges from the community except in consideration
(b)
of public services."
Although the state may grant exclusive privilege to
use streets for laying pipes, a grant of an exclusive privi-
lege of naking and vending gas ..ould fall within a constitu-
tional prohibition forbiddirg the grant "of any exclusive
privilege hereditary or otherwise."
Yet it has been held that the grant of an exclusive
privilege by a city, aftwrvards confirmed by a legislative
amendment to grantee's charter, was merely a license, which
would protect the licensee from prosecution for digging up
the public streets for the purpose of laying pipes, but that
so far as the grant attempted to confer any exclusive privi-
lege it was ineffectual, being made *:ithout valuable consider-
(d)
ation.
(a) New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Gas Co., 115 U. S. 650.
New Orleans V. W. Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674.
(b) Louisville G. Co. v. Citizens G. Co., 115 U. S. 683.
(c) St. Louis G. L. Co. v. St. Louis G. F. etc. Co., 16 Mo.
App. 52.
(d) Norwich G. L. Co. v. Norwich City G. Co., 25 Conn. 19.
CONSTRUCTION OF EXCLUSIVE GRANTS:-
It is a rule of construction that statutes creating
monopolies shall be construed strictly against the grantee.
The natural rights of the people are not to be taken away by
implication, and he who asserts an exclusive privilege in
derogation of these rights must establish it by convincing
proof. So where an exclusive grant is made, the courts will
not assume that the people intended to bind themselves to old
methods, and exclude themselves from participation in the be-
(a)
nefits of new discoveries and inventions. Thus an exclusive
right to lay pipes in the streets, for supplying artificial
(b)
gas will not exclude a company supplying natural gas, and a
grant, made before the introduction of electricity for econo-
mic purposes - giving a gas company an exclusive privilege to
manufacture and supply gas, or light and heat "by any other
means", will not be held exclusive as against an electric
light company proposing to use the streets for the purposes(c)
of its business. And assuming that an exclusive grant can be
made to a gas company, such grant is not impaired by a subse-
(d)
quent grant to an electric light company.
EXCLUSIVE GRANTS BY CITIES:-
Attempts to grant exclusive privileges are some-
times made by municipalities, but without an express delega-
(e).
tion of power by the legislature, such grants are invalid,
(a) City of Newport v. Newport L. Co., 89 Ky. 454.
(b) Warren G. L. Co. v. Penn. G. L. Co., 161 Pa. St. 510.
(c) Scranton L. & H. Co's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 154.
(d) Saginaw G. L. Co. v. City of Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529.
Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435.
(e) Grand Rapids E. L. & P. Co. v. Grand Rapids etc. Co., 33
Fed. Rep. 659; Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, supra.
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(a)
municiralities having no ini-erert power fn t', e urerises. "
power cf a city, to 7aihc such br-.t -ust e free f . d'<bt,
and it v-711 not be implied fron a ut orit- -4, t e charter
to cause the streets to Le lirrhted. T[-e .uere rct tnt a
c 't ordinance spe,- y . . . a:- by name g.-- ts .. r h to
lay pipes or erect poles the streets does r ct thereby e
(d)
the lice se exclus-ve. T-e r: ,§t to grant other lice-ies r -
(es unrestricte., to be exercised at thf-,e dl-scretion of te
cit, , and although a company has user] the streets for a long
perid of time to the exclusion of all others, the courts (f)
have power to i:qu-'re ito the validity of such exclusive use
B 't where a muiicire!t: is under obli ton to
light its strr ets, and to 2ur'nish its inhabitants with the
means of obtaining gas at their own e::- ense, it has implied
power to coxtract with others to furnish it, aiid the,-fore a
con.tract glvi,, a!. exclusive privilege to a comp& :,, is valid.
Frr in such ca_ the contr"ict is made under tc direc-tion ol
the sovereign prner: ar3 t> e object is the perfoi-ar..e of a
pub'c dutl,. A contract of t.-s cis V riviolate and
_s controlled by the gerlerLI pr" -- ipies of all contracts.
VOID GRATT OF EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE:-
A void grant of a- cxc.usive priviege, beln- in h
nature of a license, u1__ ,trt+c 'U the J--ratee fror, prosecution
(') Cit'zes G. E Id. C . .. IEcod, L ld 332.
(b) Si,-ae I. Ci-cin a ti G. L. Co., 11 O. o St. 262.
(c) Saginaw G. L. Co. v. City of Sagli'W, 2F R...p. 529.
(d) City of Rs-ville v. Rushville N. G. Co., 2' N. E. E53.
(e)Crowder v. of': of Sumvan, 12w lid. 46.
(f) State of OiO v. Cinc ... ilati G- L. ( C. Co., 18 Ohio 3t. 262
(j) City of i,ep,,!or: v. . ,,' t Co. 34 _q .
for the co:ilssion of a public nuisance in digging u, thre(a)
streets for the purpose of laying pipes, yet it does not give
the grantee such rights as vill permit it to res>i'ain another
company from laying pipes, provided its pipes are not thereby
(b)
disturbed. And in the case of a void grant of an exclusive
privilege to one comnpany, another company is not justified in
digging up the streets and laying pipes therein upon the re-
(c)
fusal of the municipality to grant it special privileges.
THE GRANT OF A EXCLUSIVE RIGHT IS A CO!WRACT:-
"hen the le.rslature grants an exclusive right to
supply gas to a municipality and its inhabitants through
pipes ad i mains laid in the public streets, it grants a fran-
chise vested in the state, the consideration of wrhich is the
performance of tn e service by the grantee, and after such
performance, the grant becomes a contract protected by the
Constitution of the United States from subsequent state leg-
islation impairing its obligation. Such contract, however,
is subject to the exercise of the ordinary police powers of
(d)
both state and municipalit;, But 1f it is one of the express
conditions of the grant t hat the le- isature iiay alter or
revoke it, a lav whflich alters or revokes it, or ;:hc , has the
effect to alter ot revoke the exclusive character of the pri-
vilege, cannot be regarded as impairing the obligation of the
(e)
contract, however harshly it may operate.
(a) City of Quincy v. Bull et al, 106 Ill. 337.
(b) Norwich G. L. Co. v. Norwich City G. Co., 25 Conn. 19.
(c) Citizens G. & 1M. Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 332.
(d) New Orleans G. Co. v. Louisiana G. Co., 15 U. S. 650;
Louisville G. Co. v. Citizens G. Co., 115 U. S. 683.
(e) hiamilton G. L. Co. v. Hamilton City, 14 U. S. 270
INVASIONS OF EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES:-
Where a company is vested with an exclusive privi-
lege, injunction is the proper remedy to prevent the city
which has granted such privilege from conferring like privi-
(a)
leges upon others. But applications for injunctions have bean
denied under similar circumstances on the ground that an in-
junction would be an unwarrantable judicial interference with
the legislative functions of a cilty, and that the courts
could not interpose to arrest the passage of the obnoxious
ordinance, although they were open, after its adoption, for
(b)
the purpose of testing its validity. However, where a com-
pany actually threatens, under an illegal grant from a muni-
cipality, to invade an exclusive privilege possessed by ano-
ther company, a court of equity will enjoin the threatened
(c)
action. No one can attack the constitutionality of the grant
of an exclusive right or privilege unless he asserts a simi-
lar conflicting one. The complainant must show that the pre-
tensions of the one asserting the exclusive privilege are
(d)
depriving him of some right.
RIGH1T TO USE STREETS A CONTRACT.
When a gas or electric light company has received a
grant of authority to use the streets, whether such authority
is given by the legislature alone, or by the legislature and
(a) City of Newport v. Newport L. Co., 84 Ky. 166.
(b) Des Moines G. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 44 Ia. 35; Mont-
gomery L. Co. v. City of Montgomery, 87 Ala. 245.
(c) Montgomery L. Co. v. City of MOntgomery, supra.
(d) New Orleans G. L. Co. v. Hart, (La.) 4 So. Rep. 215.
the municipality, the company by accepting and acting upon
such grant acquires a vested interest in the streets for the
term indicated in the grant. The grant becomes a contract
which cannot be violated by either the municipality or the
state. This principle of law is of the utmost importance
(a)
when municipalities seek to repudiate grants previously made.
It is therefore impossible for a city to alter the essential
(b)
terms of a grant without the consent of the grantee.
Until accepted or acted upon, an ordinance granting
the privilege of using the streets is a revocable license,
but when it is acted upon in a substantial manner involving
(c)
the expenditure of money, it becomes a binding contract, and
ceases to be a mere license revocable at the pleasure of the
(d)
city council.
The acceptance need not necessarily be in writing;
the purchase of land or outlay of money upon faith of the
grant is sufficient to perfect the contract between the muni-
(e)
cipality or state and the company.
As a general rule, the designation of streets by a
city gives the company an irrevocable right to use those
streets. The city council cannot at its mere will annul the
ordinance which authorized the occupation of the streets, and
leave the company's property impressed with the character of
(a) Cook, Stock & Stockholders, Sec. 913.
(b) City of New Orleans v. G. S. T. etc. Co., 40 La. Ann. 41.
(c) Chicago M. G. L. Co. v. Town of Lake, 130 Ill. 42.
(d) City of Quincy v. Bull, 106 Ill. 337; Rutland E. L. Co.
v. Marble City E. L. Co., 65 Vt. 377.
(e) Metropolitan G. Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 27 Ill. App.
361.
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a nulsance, which can at once be abated, and thus destroy the
(a)
company's business. The right of a gas company, under its
charter, to lay pipes in the streets, becomes an easement
when exercised, and is similar to the right of a railroad
(b)
company to build and occupy its road. A stipulation in a grant
from a city, that it shall be subject to all ordinances
thereafter passed, does not convert the grant into a mere
revocable permit. The condition assumes the continuance of
the original grant and subjects it only to regulations and
modifications consistent with and not subversive of the orn-
(c)
ginal grant. The grant of an exclusive privilege may be a
(d)
uontract, which cannot be impaired by subsequent grants.
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO POLICE POWERS:-
But the contract, whether conferring an excLusive
privilege or not, is subject to the exercise of the ordinary
police powers of the state and the municipality, even though
these powers are not expressly reserved, and whatever may be
the exact boundaries of these powers, there seems to be no
doubt but that they "extend to the protection of the lives,
health and property of the citizens, and to the preservation
of good order and the public morals. The legislature cannot,
by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for
(a) Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 1. J. L. 303; Common-
wealth v. Boston, 97 Mass. 555.
(b) Providence G. Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15; People v. Mut-
ual G. L. Co.,38 Miich. 154.
(c) City of New Orleans v. G. S. 7-. etc. Co., 40' La. Ann. 41.
(d) New Orleans G. Co. v. L. G. Co., 115 U. S. 650; Louis-
ville G. Co. v. Citizens G. Co., 115 U. S. 683; City of
Newport v. lNewport LigLit Co., 84 Ky. 166.
(e) N. 0. G. Co. v. L. G. Co., 15 U. S. 650; L. G. Co. v.
C. G. Co., 115 U. S. 683; City of Quincy v. Bull, 106 Il.
337; Crowder v. Town of Sullivan, 128 Ind. 486.
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these objects. They belong emphatically to that class of ob-
jects which demand the application of the maxim, salus populi
suprema lex: and they are to be attained and provided for by
such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may de-
vise. That discretion can no more be bargained away than the
(a)
power itself."
An annual charge or rent for each pole is not a val-
(b)
id exercise of police power, but a fee charged for the pur-
pose of defraying the actual costs of municipal inspection is
(c)
within those powers. Under the police power is incldded the
right to compel removal of pipes and poles which offer ob-
(d)
struction to the progress of street improvements; whether the
police power extends to the regulation of the prices which
companies may charge to consumers is a mooted question and
(e)
is hereafter discussed.
OBLIGATION TO SUPPLY.
In the absence of a controlling statute, the courts
of the different states are not agreed as to the existence of
any obligation on the part of gas and electric light companies
to supply gas or electricity to those persons residing along
the lines of the pipes and wires, who have made all necessary
preparations to use the light, and who are willing to comply
with the reasonable regulations of the company.
(a) Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25.
(b) City of New Orleans v. G. S. T. Co., 40 La. Ann. 41.
(c) City of Philadelphia v. 77. U. T. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 615.
(d) See "Changing Location of Pipes and Poles, p. 29.
(e) Page 21, infra.
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One view is that no public duty is imposed upon the
companies, and that they cannot be compelled to make or sell
'(a)
gas or electricity to anyone: nor are they bound to serve the
public any farther than a consideration of t}eir ovn inter-
(b)
ests may impel. The business does not subject those who may
chose to engage in it to duties or liabilities from which
manufacturers of other connodoties are exempt by the ordinary
(c)
rules of law.
But the weight of authority appears to affirm the
existence of a duty to supply the reasonable demands of the
public, and this seems, on principle, to be the better view.
The companies enjoy valuable franchises conferred by the
state and city; they are occupying public streets for private
purposes, and the consideration of these privileges is the
obligation to supply, under reasonable regulations, the re-
quirements of all citizens who have made arrangements to re-
ceive the light, and are willing to pay or furnish security
for the payment of that which they may consume. From the very
nature of the business, the companies have, in a limited sense,
monopolies, which ought to be tolerated only upon their as-
(d)
sumption of compensatory duties to the public. Certainly,
where the company has an exclusive privilege, a greater obli-
gation is imposed, and no fanciful or capricious reason should
(a) Commonwealth v. Lowell G. L. no., 12 Allen 75.
(b) Paterson G. L. Co. v. Brady, 27 IT. J. L. 245.
(c) McCune v. Norwich G. Co., 30 Conn. 521.
(d) Williams v. Mutual G. Co., 52 :.Tich. 499; City of Rushville
v. Rushville Natural G. Co., 28 -I. E. (Ind.) 853.
(a)
excuse the company from serving those who may apply to it.
Where a company disregards its obligation and refuses to sup-(b)
ply, it may be compelled to do so by writ of mandamus.
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO CONSUMERS:-
The regulations prescribed by company, the due ob-
servance of which may be conditions upon which light is furn-
ished, must be reasonable, as where they are designed and
adapted to secure safety in use, to provide for inspection,
and to protect the company itself from fraud. As it is mani-
festly impossible to demand and insist upon payment at the
time the gas or electricity enters the consumer's pipes or
wires, the company may require a reasonable deposit to secure
(c)
itself from the consumer's possible default. It is a reason-
able regulation to require the application for supply to be
in writing and to state the number of burners which it is
(d)
proposed to be used, but a requirement that an applicant
shall pay the debt of a former owner of his building is op-
(e)
pressive and illegal. The secretary and general manager of a
company may waive its regulations, and if a rule of the com-
pany requires that an application should be in writing, and
an oral application is refused for other reasons, the company
cannot afterwards justify its refusal on the ground that the
(f)
application was not in writing.
(a) Shepherd v. Milwaukee G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 526; Gas L. Co.
v. Colliday, 25 "Id. 1; 1Tew Orleans G. 7- . Co. v. Pauld-
ing, 12 Rob. (La.) 378.
(b) Portland Natural G. 7 0. Co. v. State, 135 Ind. 54.
(c) Williams v. Nutual G. Co., 52 Mich. 499.
(d) Shepherd v. lvilwaukee G. L. Co., 11 7ris. 243; s. c. 15
Wis. 349.
(e) New Orleans G. & B. Co. v. Paulding, 12 Rob. (La.) 378.
(f) Shepherd v. M1ilwaukee G. Co., supra.
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A gas company, however, is not under any obligation
to supply meters to those who have discontinued the use of
gas, and who are using electricity supplied by another com-
pany. The meters being desired, so that gas might be resort-
ed to in case of any interruption in the supply of electri-
(a)
city.
The entire matter of this duty to supply is now
regulated by statute, with more or less detail, in a large
number of the states.
STA"IF AD- MTICIPAL REGULATIOT. OF PRICES.
An inquiry as to the power of a state or municipal-
ity to regulate the prices of gas and electricity, when such
power is not reserved in charter or franchise, is one both
important and difficult. If we keep in mind the wide diver-
sity of opinion as to whether these companies are of a public(b)
character, and as to their duty to furnish gas and electri-
city to those desiring them, it is not surprising to find
discordant views upon the power to regulate prices.
If the business of supplying gas and electricity be
regarded as an ordinary manufacturing business, and the com-
panies as owing no particular duties to the public, free to
deal or not to deal with the citizen as policy or caprice may
suggest, and independent and unrestrained except by the terms
of their charters, then the power to fix prices may well be
(a) Fleming v. N[ontgomery L. Co., 100 Ala. 657.
(b) See p. 18.
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doubted, unless we are prepared to admit that the legislature
may regulate, at its pleasure, prices in all businesses.
On the other hand if it be re.-arded as a public
business, it may be argued that the companies engaged in it
thereby, in effect, grant the public an interest in it, and
tacitly agree to submit to regulation for the public good.
It is not hastily to be presumed, especially in cases of mo-
nopolies, that the legislature intended to exempt the busi-
ness from public control in respect to the terms upon which
it should discharge its duties to the public, and the pre-
(a)
sumption yields only to the express terms of the charter.
Thus where the right to fix its own prices is not expressly
conferred by the charter of a company, the prices may be reg-
(b)
ulated by the city council, and it has been held that the
power of a city council to provide reasonable regulations for
the safe supply, distribution and consumption of gas within
the limits of a city, includes the power to fix the maximum
rates which may be charged by a company doing business within
(c)
the city.
Where the city council has power to regulate prices,
the power should be reasonably and fairly exercised. If the
council fraudulently fix a price, which they know is less
than the cost to manufacture, the price so fixed is not bind-
(d)
ing upon the company-
Where the power of regulation is denied, the decis-
(a) State v. Columbus G. L. F> C. Co., 34 Ohio St. 572.
(b) City of Zanesville v. Zanesville G_ L. Co., 47 Ohio St. 1.
(c) City of Rushville v. Rushville T. 0. Co., 28 ''. E. 853,(In
(d) State v. Cincinnati r-. L. P- C. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262.
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ions proceed upon the theory that the right of the companies
to fix their own prices is an inevitable incident of the char
tered right to engage in the business, and 7hile the power of
a company to fix its own prices is implied, it nevertheless
exists, and is as much a part of the charter as if expressly
stated therein. Any attempt, therefore, to regulate prices
would be an attempt to impair the obligation of a contract,
and contrary to the Constitution of the United States. Such
attempts cannot find shelter within the police power of the
state, not being re rulations intended to promote the comfort,
safety or welfare of society. A corporation car-not be de-
prived, under the guise of regulation, of valuable rights and
privileges conferred by its charter. The charter being a
contract between the state and the corporation, which vests
in the latter an absolute right to fix its own prices, such
prices cannot be diminished by subsequent legislation, state
(a)
or municipal.
The power of a municipality to regulate tLs streets
does not ordinarily include the power to regulate the charges
of telephone, gas and electric companies using those streets.
Such power must be expressly conferred upon the municipality
(b)
by the legislature.
(a) Ztate v. Laclede G. I. Co., 102 ::o. 472.
(b) City of St. Louis v. _-ell Telephone Co., 96 :o. 623.
IR GULAP GF S OF PRIVI LGES.
If it is claimed that a company is exercising a
privilege in the streets without proper authority, the city,
and not the tax payers, is the proper party to question the
(a)
right. The grant of a franchise must be attacked in a direct
proceeding instituted for that purpose; it cannot be impeach-
(b)
ed collaterally. The legality of the ordinance granting a
franchise may be reviewed on certiorari, and it may be chal-
lenged by companies legally doing business in the streets,Cc)
and also by individuals having estates therein. "'here one
company has the right to use the streets and another attempts
to exercise the right without authority, the first company
(d)
may enjoin the usurpation.
...'. T C171 2 r ', ,7 LA IO. ,.
The power of the municipality to prescribe regula-
tions and attach conditions to the grant of a privilege to
use the streets for the purposes of gas and electric light
companies necessarily depends upon its charter or the statutes
of the state. :.1unicipalities are often delegated consider-
able latitude in these matters by the legislature. VWhere the
municipality possesses the power, it must exercise it in a
reasonable manner, and acts subjecting companies to burdens
(a) Smith et al v. 'etropolitan G. L. Co., 12 How. Pr. 187.
(b) Consumers G. & E. Co. v. Congress S. Co., 15 7. Y. Supp.624
(c) Peoples L. Co. v. Jersey City, 46 U. J. L. 297; Domestic
Telegraph Co. v. "ewark, 49 Ur. J. L. 346.
(d) Jersey City G. Co. v. Dwight, 29 U. J. Eq. 242.
and hardships, and which do not accomplish any beneficial
public purpose should not be upheld.
GAS PIPES 0?A, K: 7 ITIOITAL SERVITUDE.
r:he use of streets in cities for the purpose of
laying gas pipes therein has never been considered such an
additional servitude or such a diversion from proper street
uses as to entitle the abutting property owner, whether owner
(b)
of fee of street or not, to compensation.
"Thile such owner may be temporarily inconvenienced
during the time the street is torn up for the purpose of lay-
ing or repairing the pipes, this is one of the annoyances
which the necessities of society unavoidably inflict upon the
individual for the common adlvantage,- and it is believed that
the abutting owner would not be entitled to damages for this
inconvenience, except under unusual circumstances of wanton
(c)
disregard of his rights of access.
(a) Commissioners etc. v. orthern L. G. Co., 12 Pa. 318; MT.
E. Church v. Ind. G. Co., 22 Pitts. L. T. (M.(.) 274;
Citizens E. Co. v. Sand, 95 >ich. 551; Des Moines City
Ry. v. City of D. M., 90 Ia. 770; See "Regulation of Prices
ante p.21 ; "Taxation", post p.S L
(b) No case has been found where it was expressly decided that
there was no right to compensation, or -,here any claim for
compensation was made, but numerous cases have incidentally
mentioned the matter and have uniformly regarded the Lying
of gas pipes in the streets as a legitimate use of the
same,- which does not deprive the abutting owner of any
property right for which 'e is entitled to compensation.
eople v. '.err, 27 :-. Y. 202; City of 'oston v. ',ichardson,
13 Allen 160; Mi Thau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 210; Pierce v.
Drew, 136 Mass. 81; City of Q"uincy v. Bull, 106 Ill. 137;
Crooke v. latbush "'. 7. Co., 29 Dun. 245; People v.
Thompson, 65 -ow. Vr. 7ep. 417.
(c) Fry v. Clark, 8 Chio Zt. 374; Commonwealth v. assmore,
1 Serg. F,- Rawle Tep. (Pa.) 217.
'~? TP~ A9~~D T 'IOAL SEPRVTJ 7 : C'u~ PXC)
But another rule is applicable in the use of coun-
try roads, and the owner of the soil of the highway is entit-
led to compensation. The public easement in country highways
is less extensive than in city streets, being limited to a
right of passage, with the rights incident thereto, under
which may be included the right to drain, and the rigkt to
the use of the soil on the line of the road for construction
and repairs. Ordinarily any other uses would be trespasses
for which the abutting owner has the usual remedies. The
legislature may authorize a gas company to lay pipes in these
highways, and thus render its operations lawful, but such use
constitutes a taking of property, and compensation must be
(a)
made to the abutting owner. And a court of equity will res-
train the laying of pipes as an injury of such a continuing
and permanent nature, that an action at law would not be a
(b)
complete remedy.
But after the pipes have been laid, and the company
has expended large sums on the work, equity may refuse to
interfere by injunction and may leave the abutting owner to
(c)
his remedy at law.
(a) 3loomfield f. Rochester . . Co. v. >!kins, 62 3. . 86.
(bl Sterling's !ppeal, 111 -a. St. 351.
(c) :incaid v. Indianapolis 1. :. Co., 124 Ind. 577.
ELECTRIC LIGT POLES, ADDITIm2:AL SE"VITUDE.
hen the poles are erected for the purpose of light-
ing the streets, thus making the use of the streets more safe
and convenient at night, the abutting property owner cannot
maintain a claim for additional compensation. Lighting the
streets is one of the public uses to which a street may be
(a)
properly devoted, and when the streets were taken for public
use they were taken for all the purposes to which they may be
properly devoted, and full compensation was then awarded to
(b)
the owners. But when the poles are erected for private pur-
poses it is believed that they impose such an additional
servitude upon the street, not contemplated when the public
easement was acquired, as to entitle the abutting property
(c)
owner to further compensation. The decisions, in which the
question of compensation has been adverted to, are not nume-
rous, nor can they be considered as decisive.
The analogy between the use of streets for poles
and wires by electric light companies, and by telegraph and
telephone companies is apparent, and it may be safe to assume
that the same considerations which have influenced courts in
their decisions as to telegraph and telephone poles will have
(a) People v. Thompson, 65 How. Pr. Rep. 407; Johnson v.
Thomson-1iouston E. Co., 54 Hun 469; Lahr v. NLetropolitan
Elevated Ry. Co., 104 '. Y. 292.
(b) Consumers C. . E. L. Co. v. Congress S. Co., 15 IT. Y.
Supp. 464.
(c) Tuttle v. Brush E. Co., 50 '. Y. Sup. Ct. R. 464; :.etro-
politan Tel. etc. Co. v. Colwell Lead Co., 67 ."ow. Pr. 365;
contra semble 7"estern Union Tel. Co. v. Guernsey " Scud-
der E. L. Co., 46 ::o. App. 120.
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controlling effect when the question of electric light poles
is before them. It must be said that the preponderance of
authority is in favor of the proposition that telegraph and
telephone poles are inconsistent with proper street uses and
are an additional servitude upon the fee, when it is vested
in the abutting owner, or when not so vested, are a material
infringement of his rights of access, light and air, which
(a)
entitle him to compensation.
But a contrary view has been supported with much
learning and reason; it being contended that the exercise of
the public easements in the streets is susceptible to expan-
sion so as to include all new and improved uses, which are of
common utility and convenience and not inconsistent with the
general purposes of streets and highways as avenues of com-
munication. The erection of telephone and telegraph poles is
considered as consistent with street uses, and therefore is
(b)
not an invasion of any private property rights.
ELECTRIC LIGHT POLES I~l COUITR HIGHWAYS:-
There the soil of a country highway is owned by the
(a) Board of Trade v. Barnett, 107 Ill. 507; W. U. T. Co. v.
,illiams, 86 Va. 696; Stowers v. Cable Co., 68 :MIiss. 559;
Telephone Co. v. "Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36; Eels v. Teler-raph
Co., 143 1. Y. 133; Dusenbury v. M utual Tel. Co., ii Abb.
N. C. 440; 'Ietropolitan Tel. etc. Co. v. Colwell Lead
Co., 67 low. Pr. Rep. 365.
(b) Cater v. M. 7. Tel. Exch Co., 63 U. T . (Minn.) 111; Julia
Bldg. & Loan Asso. v. Bell Tel. Co., 8C 'do. 258; Pierce et
al v. Drew et al, 136 M.ass. 75; People v. Eaton, 100 Mich.
208; Iershfield v. Rocky 7Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 12 7Mont.
102; Irwin v. Tel. Co., 37 La. Ann. 63; Rugg v. Commer-
cial Union Tel. Co., 66 Vt. 209.
abutting property o-ner, an electric light company ma, not
erect its poles thereon without making compensation to the
(a)
owner.
Perhaps the sounder view is t-at the erection of
poles and the stringing of wires for private purposes in the
streets of cities, attended, as it may be, with serious dam-
age or inconvenience to the abutting owner, is not a street
use proper, and hence entitle such owner to compensation for
(b)
such use or for any actual injury to his property.
Cm A:G T7TG LOCATO'? OF PIPES AD POLES.
A gas company occupying a public street takes the
risk of the location of its pipes, and must make, at its own
cost, such changes as public necessity, convenience or secur-
(c)
ity demand. In grading and improving the streets , the remov-
al or change in location of the pipes and mair- frequently
becomes necessary, and the city may require the owner of the
pipes to make all needful changes, even though the pipes are
in the street under a valid contract. The right to do this
falls within the police powers of a munlcipality~which cannot
be surrendered, and any contract is accordingly held to be
subject to these powers. The city council, and not the courts,
(d)
are the judges of the necessity of the exercise of this power.
7ihere a contractor building a sever for a city agrees that he
(a) Haverford E. L. Co. v. '-art, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Pep. 369.
(b) Dillon on :un. Corp. Sec. 698a.
(c) In re Deering, 93 ',. Y. 361.
(d) Roanoke Gas 2o. v. City of 7oanoke, 14 S. 7. 665.
will bear all damages arising out of his undertaking, he is
(a)
liable for loss and damage to the mains of a gas company.
There the construction of a sewer or other public
work necessitates the removal or change in location of the
pipes, it is believed the company would be compelled to make
all requisite changes at its own cost. Put where the change
would entail great expense upon the company and the sewer
could be just as well constructed on either side of the pipes,
it is doubtful whether the pipes could be disturbed. Al-
though the company's franchise was accepted subject to the
exercise of the police powers of the municipality, yet any
exercise of this power must be reasonable and consonant with
its general powers and purposes, and an ordinance is unrea-
sonable if it be partial, unfair or oppressive in its effects,
(b)
as by imposing a serious burden without an adequate cause.
The presumption is, however, that the city is proceeding in
such a manner as not to unreasonably and unnecessarily inter-
(c)
fere with the rights of the company.
A gas company is bound to know the exact location
of its pipes in the streets, and to give correct information
to all who are entitled to demand it. Should the company
wrongly represent the location of its pipes, so as to lead,
for instance, a street railway company to lay its track over
them when it was seeking to avoid them, then the gas company
(a) In re "oughton, 20 Hun 395.
(b) Des Toinew City y Co. v. City of Des I'oines, 90 Ia. 770;
Clapp v. City of Spokane, 53 Fed. Rep. 515.
(c) Spokane St. Py. Co. v. City of Spokane, 5 Wash. St. 634.
would be estopped from claiming the right to disturb the
(a)
track.
POLES:-
Similarly, municipal authorities may compel an
electric light company to change the location of its poles
when street improvements so require. And even though the
grant to use the streets should be conferred directly by the
legislature, and not be made expressly subject to municipal
control or the assent of the local authorities, the grant
must be taken as subject to the general control of the muni-
(b)
cipality over the streets.
PLAC!TG "'JIRES 'U'DETGROU1D.
Electric light companies may be compelled to place
their wires beneath the surface of the streets, and such re-
quirement is not considered by the courts as annuling or des-
troying any contract rights, but as simply a regulation of
their exercise. The laws making this requirement are police
regulations, designed for the convenience and security of the
(c)
public. 17hen subways are constructed and are ready for the
reception of the wires, and a company fails to remove its
wires which are strung from poles in the street, after a rea-
sonable opportunity has been afforded for their removal, the
city may abate the poles and wires as a nuisance, doing no
(d)
unnecessary damage. And companies may be assessed to pay the
(a) Davenport -en. Ry. ?o. v. Davenport G. L. "o., 43 Ia. 301.
(b) onongehela City v. :onongeela F. r. 'o., 3 a ist. ep.
63.
(c) 'eople v. Squire, T07 . 593.
(d) American rapid Tel. Co. v. Jacob 'Tess, 125 7. 7. 641.
salaries and expenses of a Board of Commissioners having
charge of the electrical subways constructed for their pur-
poses, and such assessment is not unconstitutional as depriv-
(a)
ing them of their property without due process of law.
IEGL I GENCE.
Gas light and electric light companies having with-
in their control agencies which may become highly dangerous
to the public, are required to use in the management and
prosecution of their business a degree of care proportionate
to the dangers involved. The standard of care is reasonable
care under the circumstances, which is usually a question of
fact for the jury. '7here the facts are not disputed, and
reasonable men could draw but one inference from the evidence,
the question of negligence should be withdrawn from the jury
and decided by the court.
MEGLICIFCE OF C-AS C0,A ITES:-
Ordinary illuminating gas is highly inflamable: it
becomes dangerously explosive when mixed in certain propor-
tions with atmospheric air, and when inhaled by human beings
produces sickness or even death. Therefore a company under-
taking to use public streets for the purpose of conveying gas
to its customers is bound to exercise a degree of care com-
mensurate with the hazards inseparably concoitant; it must
provide pipes of sufficient strength and imperviability,
must lay them with proper skill and must exercise a watchful
(a) New York v. Squire, 145 U. S. 75.
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(a)
care in their maintenance and repair. It is bound to use due
care not cnly on the part of itself and its servants, but
also due care in preventing and repairing injuries to its
pipes arising from the careless or wrongful meddling or in-
(b)
terference of others. Thus where a city in building a sewer
displaces the earth around a previously laid gas pipe causing
it to leak, it was held that although the gas company could
not prevent the operations of the city, yet it was bound to
see that the earth around its pipes was properly restored and
that its pipes were sufficiently supported, and if the pipes
were injured it was the company's duty to make all necessary
repairs with reasonable diligence. 1Megligence is imputed to
. (c)
any ddreliction in these particulars. ut where the company
has no knowledge of the city's operations, which occasion a
leak in its mains, the mere facts that a pipe was broken and
that gas escaped are not of themselves sufficient to estab-
lish the company's liability, although it is evidence of neg-
(d)
lect. If the company have no notice of the leak, and is oth-
erwise without fault, it is not liable until the existence of
the leak is brought to its knowledge, or it might have dis-
covered the defect by the exercise of due diligence, and it
(e)
has had a reasonable time to make the necessary repairs; to
(a) Smith v. Boston G. L. Co., 129 .lass. 318; Carmody v.
Boston G. L. Co., 162 ".ass. 536.
(b) Brown v. 3?. Y. G. L. Co., Anthon's N. P. Cases, 351.
(c) Butcher v. Providence G- Co., 12 R. I. 149; Oil City G.
Co. v. Robinson, 99 Pa. St. 1.
(d) Carmody v. Boston G- L. Co., 162 'lass. 536.
(e) Funt et al v. Lowell G. L. Co., 8 Allen 169.
fix a lack of this diligence, it is competent to show that
(a)
passers-by noticed the escaping gas. Where gas escapes from
a main in the streets, and finds entrance into a house
through a sewer, and in its passage takes up poisonous sewer
gases, the escape of the gas from the main is the proximate
cause of any injury sustained by the inhalation of the com-
(b)
bined gases.
The escape of gas from a street main raises no
presumption of negligence on the part of the company. The
(c)
one alleging negligence must prove it. Yet where one is in-
jured by inhaling gas which escaped from a leak in a street
main, and the attending circumstances conclusively negative
contributory negligence, there is enough evidence of want of
proper care on the part of the gas company to make it respon-
sible on the ground that it is bound to conduct its gas in a
proper manner, and the fact that gas escaped is prima facie
(d)
evidence of some neglect on its part.
EVIDPETCE OF T4EGLIGET_:CE:-
Evidence that the gas company was negligent in per-
mitting gas to escape into houses on one side of a street is
not admissible to prove negligence as to its escape into
(e)
houses on the other side of the street, but where it was al-
leged that gas escaped into a green-house by passing through
a sewer connected with a public sewer, evidence of gas in
(a) Emerson v. Lowell -F. L. Co., 3 Allen 410.
(b) Yunt et al v. Lowell G. L. Co., 8 Allen 169.
(c) Bartlett v. Poston .- r. Co., 122 -ass. 209; l'utchinson
v. 2oston G. I. Co., 122 Mass. 219.
(d) Smith v. Boston G. T. Co., 129 i'ass. 318.
(e) Emerson v. Lowell 5. L. Co., 6 Allen 147.
other green-houses connected with the same public sewer was
(a)
admitted. It is proper to show that before the escape of the
gas into a house all members of the family residing therein
(b)
were in good health, and that afterwards they all became ill,
but not of the sickness of other persons following the escape
of gas into other houses.
I" :"AT7 AT',-  REPAIT7'I:G FTT1'S -
A company is bound to use reasonable care in main-
taining and repairing its pipes, and should have a sufficient
force of servants available for that purpose, but it is not
bound to anticipate any extraordirary demand upon its re-
sources, and provide for exigencies which prudent men would
(d)
not forsee. It is always proper for the company to show its
system of doing business and t1e precautions taken to dis-
(e)
cover and repair leaks.
EX"rCA, AT fh
gas company digging up the public streets for the
purpose of laying its pipes is bound to take reasonable care
to protect the public from injury during, the progress of the
work. The excavations should be properly guarded by barriers
and signal lights at night, and when the pipes are laid, the
company should restore the street to a safe condition; it
cannot escape liability for injuries occasioned by the impro-
(a) Butcher v. Providence G. Co., 12 R. I. 149.
(b) hunt et al v. Lowell G. L. Co., I Alien 343.
(c) Emerson v. Lowell G. L. Co., 6 ,lien 147.
(d) H1olly v. Boston G. 7L. Co., 8 Gray 123; "utchinson v.
oston C. L. Co., 122 "ass. 219.
(e) Powers v. 'oston G. L. Co., 158 'ass. 257.
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per filling of its trenches or other negligent performance of
the work, by showing that it contracted with others to do the
(a)
work, but where the work is done without competent authority
from the proper officers of the company, it is not answer-
(b)
able for injuries resulting from its negligent performance.
CO."N. ?,!h3TORY i_1TGLI(,ENCE :-
W1here the plaintiff has been guilty of contributory
negligence he cannot recover damages from the gas company.
It is contributory negligence for one to remain in his resi-
dence when he knows that gas is escaping into it, and he has
(c)
an opportunity to secure another house. And where a civil
engineer employed about the construction of a public sewer,
knowing that there was a leak in a gas main caused by the
work on the sewer, and of the probability of the gas escaping
into the sewer in dangerous quantities, entered the sewer
with a light, and an explosian followed, there was such con-
tributory negligence upon his part as to preclude the recov-
(d)
ery of any damages from the gas company.
NEGLI(t-1t,4CE - ELECTRIC LIGIIT COMPANIES:-
An electric light company erecting its poles and
stringing its wires in the streets of a city must exercise
reasonable care in their construction and maintenance, and
must exercise the same degree of care in preventing mischief
by the dangerous electrical currents flowing through the wires.
(a) McCamus v. Citizens G. L. Co., 40 Barb. 380.
(b) !oblesville G. 2 I. Co. v. Lochn, 124 Ind. 79.
(c) Punt v. Lowell G. L. Co., 1 Allen 343; Iolly v. Boston
G_ L. Co., 8 Gray 123.
(d) Oil City G. Co. v. Robinson, 99 Pa. St. 1.
reasonable care, in this connection, means a degree of care
commensurate with the dangers involved. The instrumentali-
ties employed have a great capacity for harm, to both life
and property, and consequently very great skill and circum-
spection must be constantly exerted intheircontrol and oper-
(a)
ation. The poles should be stout and firmly set, the cross
arms strong and well secured, and wires should be of good
material, and safely insulated in all places where danger may
(b)
be reasonably apprehended. The poles should be guyed where
necessary for stability, and all details of construction
carefully observed, for companies are bound to use the streets
without subjecting travelers to danger or injury, so far as
the employment of suitable and safe appliances, and watchful
(c)
inspection will prevent. And while it is obligated to a high
(d)
degree of care and diligence, it is not bound to take every
precaution that fertile imagination or"ingenious conjecture:"
might sugest. It is not bound to use perfect apparatus, nor
is it an insurer of the safety of those using the streets.
If it provide and maintains reasonably safe and strong poles
and wires it has discharged its duty. Tt is only bound to
anticipate and guard against those contingencies which the
law supposes to be in the contemplation of practical and pru-
dent men. Therefore a company is not liable for injury oc-
(a) Consolidated F. L. Co. v. 'eoples E. L. - G. so., 94 Ala.
372; )ichols v. City of "inneapolis, 33 "inn. 430.
1b) Illin' sworth v. ?oston . L. o., 161 M.ass. 583; U. S.
Illuminating Co. v. 2ratu, 55 Tun 222.
(c) Haynes v. Raleigh 7. so., 114 -. C . 23.
(d) U. 7. Illuminating 2o. v. ?rant, 55 un 23'?.
casioned by a falling pole, succumbing to the stress of an
(a) (b)
extraordinary snow storm, nor of a cyclone, or to the shock
(c)
of the impact of a runaway team.
in erecting poles and wires, the safety of travel-
lers on the street must not be neglected. Thus careless
blasting in setting poles will render company liable to those
(d)
injured. And wires should not be allowed to remain on side-
walks where they may trip passers-by. One walking along the
sidewalk has a right to presume that it is free from obstruc-
tion, until attention is called1 thereto. And one becoming
entangled in the :!ires so negligently placed, is not guilty
of contributory negligence, although the accident occurs in
(e)
the day time.
UM77USED WI RES :-
Unused wires should not be permitted to remain in
streets, and especially should the connections with premises
of others be effectually broken. Accidental contact with
live wires may animate them with destructive energy, or
]lightning may be thus conducted to another's property, and
the company owning the wires is responsible for any ensuing
damages. Such occurrence is a probability which might have
been reasonably foreseen, and the fact that the primary cause
of the injury, in the case of lightning, is an act of God,
furnishes no defence - the company's neglirence in leaving
(a) 7'ard v. 'tlantic Pacific Tel. Co., 71 :.. Y. 81.
(b) "itchell v. Charleston 1. . Co., 22 .S  (7. C. 1895),
767.
(c) Allen v. Atlantic etc. Tel. Co., 21 -Mun. 22.
(d) Prunner v. mcrican & . Co., 160 Pa. -t. 3".
(e) 7 rush E. L. Co. v. T elly, 126 ind. 220.
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the wires where they might do damage, is the proximate cause
(a)
of the injury.
Unused wires should not be allowed to hang from
poles, although disconnected. The company owning the wires
is bound to anticipate the probabilities of the acts of med-
dlers, boys and irresponsible parties, and if, through their
interference or by accident, the wires should become charged
by contact with a live wire, and injury result, the company
is liable for neglecting to look after the wires and keep
(b)
them harmless.
SAGGI G AID FALLEI WIRES:-
The wires should be strung and maintained under
sufficient tension to prevent them from sagging so as to ob-
struct the street, or to come in contact with the wires of
other companies. It is negligence for a company to allow a
wire, otherwise harmless, which has fallen upon the heavily
charged wire of another company, to remain there after its
dangerous position could have been discovered by the exercise
of reasonable care; and where the condition of the aires is
so apparent as to challenge the attention of a prudent man
employed by either of the companies, both are liable for any
(c)
resultant damages. A traveller who is injured by coming in
contact during an electric storn with a wire negligently per-
mitted to remain suspended across a street a few feet above
(a) Jackson v. 'isconsin Tel. Co., 88 Tis. 243.
(b) Ahern v. Oregon T. , T. Co., 24 Ore. 276.
(c) Electric Ry. Co. v. Shelton, 89 Tenn. 421.
the ground, is entitled to recover from the company owning
the wire, although the dangerous condition of the wire may be
due to electricity attracted from the atmosphere, for the
(a)
electricity would have been harmless except for the wire.
GUY WIRES - 1AITGITG WIRES:-
A company is bound to keep its guy wires in place:
such a wire detached from its anchorage and hanging in the
street where it is liable to be touched is prima facie evi-
dence of neglect, and the burden of showing due care is upon
(b)
the company. A person passing along the street does not
cease to be a traveller, if he stops to remove a dangling
wire which obstructs the way,- even though it constitutes no
serious impediment to his passage. And if he be injured by
(c)
an electric shock, both the city and the company are liable.
INSULAT ION: -
It is negligence for an electric company to fail to
keep its wires, which are charged so as to be dangerous to
life, properly insulated, especially where the public is
(d)
likely to come in contact with them. Such wires without safe
(e)
insulation are public nuisances, and the city may abate them.
Failure to observe a city ordinance which requires that all
(f)
splices should be safely insulated is negligence.
UNSAFE CONDITION OF WIRPES:-
If the unsafe condition of a company's wires is due
(a) Southwestern T. etc. Co. v. Robinson, 50 Fed. Rep. 810.
(b) Iaynes v. Raleigh G. Co., 19 S. 7. 344.
(c) Bourget v. City of Cambridge, 156 11Mass. 391.
(d) Illingsworth v. Boston E. L. Co., 161 :ass. 583.
(e) U. S. Illuminating Co. v. Grant, 55 ?un 222.
(f) Clements v. Lousiana E. L. Co., 44 La. Ann. 692.
to causes for which the company is not responsible, it is
negligence to permit such condition to continue after notice
has been received and a reasonable time to remove the danger
(a)
has passed.
PUNITIVE DKAGES:-
When a company knows that its wires are grounded,
it seems that the continued generation of electricity may
subject it to punitive damages, if a traveller upon a street
sustains injury by reason of the defective condition of the
(b)
wires.
JUDICIAL NOTICE:-
Courts take judicial notice of the dangerous char-
acter of wires sufficiently charged with electricity to sub-
serve the purposes of city illumibation; of the fact that the
erection and regulation of the distributive apparatus of a
company require that its servants ascend the poles and go
among the wires: and of the dangers apt to arise from the
(c)
proximity of the wires of different companies.
CO1 TFLICTIP1G RIGHTS.
Cases arise where the right of an electric light
company to use the streets comes in conflict with the rights
of telegraph, telephone and other electric light companies,
claiming similar rights. The electric light wires conducting
powerful currents are neither desirable nor safe neighbors
(a) Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 430.
(b) Texarkana G. cS E. L. Co. v. Orr, 59 Ark. 215.
(c) Consolidated R. L. Co. v. Peoples etc. Co., 94 Ala. 372.
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for the telegraph or telephone wires, carrying weak and harm-
less currents. Electric light wires in close proximity to
telegraph and telephone wires may induce currents in them
which may injuriously affect, if not wholly prevent, their
operations. Sagging and broken electric light wires may
cause contacts and crosses, imparting to the telegraph and
telephone wires an energy destructive to life and property.
The exclusiveness so often and so obstinately manifested by
one company, when another proposes to invade its neighbor-
hood, has therefore other grounds than mere boorishness. To
settle the contests between the disputi.ng companies, the
courts invoke the maxim, "Prior tempore, prior jure".
Thus the rights of an electric light company which
has first occupied a street, are superior to those of a tele-
phone company seeking to use the same street, and the latter
cannot enjoin the electric light company from erecting its
(a)
poles and wires, but if the telegraph or telephone company
was first in point of time, and it appears that the effi-
cient operation of its wires will be impaired by the proximi-
ty of the electric light wires about to be erected, the elec-
(b)
tric light company must yield. And an electric light company
will be restrained from erecting and maintaining its poles
and wires in such manner as to interfere with those already
erected by another electric light company under lawful author-
(a) Lebraska Tel. Co. v. York G. & E. L. Co., 27 Neb. 284.
(b) '.. U. T. Co. v. G. & S. E. L. Co., 46 Mo. App. 120; Paris
E. L. etc. Co. v. Southwestern Tel. etc. Co., 27 S. V!.
902; Bell Tel. Co. v. Belleville E. L. Co., 12 Ont. Rep.
571.
ity from the municipality for the company first occupying
the streets, by its expenditures of money on the faith of its
license acquired a vested right therein, which the municipal-
ity could not impair by a subsequent grant, and any subse-
quent grant is subordinate to and must not infringe the first
(a)
grant. While the first company should not be molested by
new-comers, yet it cannot sustain a claim for more space than
is reasonably required for the safe and successful operation
of its lines. If a company, without exclusive right, unnec-
essarily occupies both sides of a street for the purpose of
excluding rival companies, it clearly abuses its privilege,
yet this abuse will not justify a rival in erecting its poles
and stringing its wires in such proximity to the first com-
pany's lines as might lead to a destruction of life or pro-
(b)
perty.
And it seems that if each of two or more companies
has the right to erect poles and string wires in the streets
of a city, that the rights of the company which first begins
and diligently prosecutes tbe construction of its lines upon
a street or system of streets, are superior to those of the
others, and may even extend to the exclusion of the other com-
(c)
panies, should the full enjoyment of its rights so require.
(a) Rutland E. L. Co. v. Marble City E. L. Co., 65 Vt. 377.
(b) Consolidated E. L. Co. v. Peoples etc. Co., 94 Ala. 372.
(c) Indianapolis Cable St. Ry. Co. v. Citizens St. Ry. Co.,
24 N. E. (Ind.) 1054.
JOINT USE OF POLES.
It is often highly convenient for one company to
attach its wires to the poles of another. An arrangement of
this sort ray effect a material saving to both companies in
construction and repair accounts; one pole serving where
otherwise two would be required, and such arrangement is ad-
vantageous to the public, in that it lessens the number of
poles in the streets. But it is clear that such attachments
cannot be rightfully made without the consent of the owner of
the poles. If a company attaches its wires to the poles of
another company without the latter's permission, it is a
trespasser, and the company owning the poles may remove the
wires as a nuisance. The trespassing company does not, how-
ever, thereby forfeit its property in the wires, and if the
company removing them carries them away, it is liable for
(a)
their conversion.
Sometimes a municipality, when conferring the right
to erect poles in the vtreets, reserves the power to grant
the use of the poles to others upon payment of a proportionate
part of their cost or upon other equitable terms. This is a
prudent stipulation, and when the power is opportunely ex-
ercised cannot he otherwise then benificial to the public.
But the municipality should exercise the reserved right in a
reasonable manner, and should make its subsequent grants sub-
(a) Electric Power Co. v. Metropolitan Tel. Co., 75 Hun 68.
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ject to such limitations and regulations as will prevent the
undue abridgement of the first company's privileges. Other-
(a)
wise the subsequent grant will be abortive and void.
DUTY TO LICENSEE:-
When a company permits another to use its poles,
the wires of both companies being charged with dangerous
currents, the company owning the poles is bound to keep its
wires and poles, so far as is practicable, in a safe condi-
tion at all places where the servants of the licensee company
are expressly or impliedly authorized to go in the perform-
ance of their ordinary duties pertaining to their employer's
(b)
wires. But a company is not liable for injuries sustained by
the employee of another company who climbs its poles without
license. Nor can such employee recover from a third company
whose negligence has rendered the pole unsafe. He becomes a
trespasser by leaving his place in the street,and climbs the
(c)
pole at his peril.
INJURIES FROM IIPLIED LICENSEE'S WIRES:-
When a company fastens its wires to the poles of
another without the latter's affirmative consent, the relation
of licensor and implied licensee may arise,- but such relation
will not render the owner of the poles liable for injuries to
travellers caused by the negligence of the other company in
(d)
respect to its wires.
(a) Citizens Electric etc. Co. v. Sand, 95 L.ich. 551.
(b) Illingsworth v. Boston E. L. Co., 161 ".tass. 583.
(c) Augusta Ry. Co. v. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653.
(d) Hohnes v. Union Tel. etc. Co., 16 7. Y. "upp. 563.
UJAUTORIZED ATTACTMENTS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY.
A company attaching its wires to private premises
without the consent of the owner is bound to indemnify him
for all damages which he may be compelled to pay to third (a)
parties for injuries sustained by reason of the attachments.
But if one acquisces for years in the continuance of poles
and wires in a private alley appurtenant to his lot, he can-
not hold the company responsible for a loss by fire merely
because the poles and wires hinder the firemen in their ef-
(b)
forts to extinguish the fire.
The statutes of a number of the states provide that
when poles or wires of electric companies are placed upon,
attached to, or are erected so as to extend over any land or
buildings, that no lapse of time shall raise a presumption
of a grant or justify a prescriptive right in favor of the
company.
SHADE TREES.
In erecting poles and wires it is often necessary
to cut away a portion of the limbs and foliage of trees grow-
ing in or overhanging the street. Companies lawfully occupy-
ing streets undoubtedly have the right to do this, and it is
a matter often regulated by statute. The right should be
carefully exercised, and all unnecessary trilriing or mutila-
tion should be scrupulously avoided, and if the poles and
(a) Gray v. Boston G. L. Co., 114 Mass. 149.
(b) Chaffee v. Tel. c, Tel. Con. Co., 77 Mich. 625.
wires can be placed elsewhere without inconvenience, the
trees should be left untouched. For any abuse of this right
(a)
companies are held strictly aeccuntable. So if sa:e trees
are killed by gas negligently permitted to escape from a main(b)
in the street, the gas company is liable in damages.
LIABILITY FOR NUISANCES - CITY AID COMPANIES.
The duty of mairtaining the streets in a safe con-
dition rests primarily upon the municipality, and this is an
(c)
obligation which it cannot evade, suspend or cast off. The
municipality cannot, therefore, place a dangerous obstruction
to travel in its streets, or suffer it to be done by others,
without liability; and where it authorizes poles and wires to
be erected in the streets by an electric light company, each
and both are liable for damages to travellers from suich ob-
(d)
struction. .here a statute authorizes poles to be set in the
streets, but so as not to incommode public travel, a company
undertaking to use such privilege .-ust use reaso,,able care in
selecting locations for its poles. If suc, care is used, the
company is not liable for accidents occurriig under extraord-
Ce)
inary circumstances. In -assachusetts, it has heen held,
that were the poles tre set in places designated br the
selectmen of the town, the town is not liable for injuries
(a) Tissot v. Great Southern etc. Co., 39 La. Ann. 996.
(b) Evans v. Keystone G. Co., 42 ] . 513.
(c) II Dillon on :'un. Corp. ec. _027.
(d) "iolfe v. Erie :'el. etz. Co., 38 Feel. R.ep. 320; Bourget v.
City of Cambrid-e, 156 TIMass. 391; but see Eoroigh of Sus-
quehanna Depot v. Si l'ons 7 7ife, 112 Pa. St. 3PA.
(e) Sheffield v. Central Union T. Co., 3; Fed. Rep. !r4.
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sustai(Ie b17 a trave er, it >eingz ccnclusiveiv nres.i-ed that(a)
the poles offer no obstruction to the use of the streets.
But ordi-arily the nuiih-rality is liable for injuries re-
ceived by travell.ers, i' t:ie ositi in of t e pole ausir the
injury render it a -L1'sance aj :awerm's to the public, aid
±2 f "e ol- t t t t' f __ "1 ~_
vu(der its directinn i t cannot reco rer n e tl frori t ow1 -
or of the nole. .he nu-,iicinp1iJty and t-e comranv are in
rari del!cto, -0co tle c r "ota~oes do not co-stitute ar ex-
ception to the rule denying- co-.tribution or indemnity to a
joint wrong doer. These exceptions are of two classes:
i First, 'Mere the party claining indemnity has not been
gui'ty of any fault excelpt technically or co-structively, as
w.en an innocent noster i. hreld to be liable forthe torts of
his servant acting ithin the scope of his employment.
Second, 77here bot- parties have heen in fault but not in
the same fault, and the fault of him from whom the indemnity
is claimed was the primary !v-1 efficient aisc of the injury.
Very familiar illustrations of the second -lass are found in
cases of recovery arairst mnicipaities for ohstriuctions to
the highway caused by private persnns; the fault of the lat-
ter is the creation of the nuisance; that of the former to
remove it in the exercise of its duty to care for th e safe
condition of the public streets; the first was a positive
tort and the e fficient cause of the injury complained of, the
latter the negative tort, the failure to act upon notice ex-
(a) Young v. Inhabitants of Yarmouth, 9 Gray 386.
(a)
press or implied."
Where a gas comnayv has the exclusive right to lay
pipes in the streets, the rigt e::tends to lateral as well as
the main pipes, and to the placing of gas boxes, and the com-
pany is responsible for defects in these, although paid for
(b)
by the consumer. A gas box projecting above the sidewali is
such a defect in the street as will render the city liable
(c)
for injuries sustained by one tripping over the same, al-
though t, e gas company mra be compelled to indemnify the city.
In order that o-e ,a:T recover damra:,es from a ratmAi-
cipality for fnjuries sustained : the unsafc condition of the
street, it is ircmiii,et e r n lrin to show that either the city
had actual notice of the danfrer or defect, or that the want
of notice or knowledge is attributable to its neglitgence- If
the action against the city fail, the party injured is not
thereby barred of an action against the one responsible for
(e)
the nuisance.
ACTION OVER:-
When a municipality >'as been compeLled to pay damages
for injuries sustained in consequence of the unsafe condition
of the street, due to the occupation, or operation therein of
a gas or electric light company, it has a remedy over against
the company whose wrongful act or conduct rendered the street
(a) 2rustees of Geneva v. Brush El. Co., 50 Hun 581.
(b) District of Colunmbia v. Washin-ton G- L. Co., 20 D. C. 39.
(c) Loan v. City of Boston, 106 Mass. 450.
(d) District of Colu-bIha v. Was',in-ton G. L. Co., supra.
(e) II Dillon on 1-Hun. Cor.,. Sec. 1034.
,insafe, untess tIoe cooratin was itself a ;-rcngdoer as be(a)
tween the defendant and itself. Such cofmnaM7 s concluded by
the judgment a'-aist the cor-oration f-r its act or negli-
gence, if it kneu that the suit was )ending, and could have
defended it, ali...... i a (!; no express notice to so deend,
but it is not estopped to shcvw that .t was under no obliga-
tion to keep the street i- a safe condition, or that th3 in-
jury did not result Frrom its act or neglect, or that the cor-
(b)
poration was also at fault. Ail the verdict a.-d judgment are
conclusive upon the party in original default as to the facts:
(1.) That the street .,-as deect-ive; (2) that the person
was injured there while using due care, and (3) of the amount
of damage by the injury; but not of company's liability to
keep the place in repair; nor (2) of its having neglected to
do so, nor (3) of its neglect or failure having been the sole
(c)
cause of the injury. But the party in default will not be
permitted to prove that in making a dangerous excavation it
was guilty of no negligence, or that it properly guarded and
covered the same in leaving off work on the night of the in-
(d)
jury. When the company originally in default is duly noti-
fied to defend, the city may recover attorney's fees, in ad-
(e)
dition to the costs, and damages paid, but should the city
appeal the case without its request, the company. is not liable
(if)
for the costs of the appeal.
(a) II Dillon, Mun. Corp. Sec. I035; Chicago v. Robbins, 2
Black. 418.
(b) Robbins v. City of Chicago, 4 Wall. 657.
(c) City of Boston v. Worthington, I0 Gray 496.
(d) City of Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me. 46.
(e) Westfield v. Mayo, 122 1Mass. I00.
(f) Ottumwa v. Parks, 43 Ia. 119.
INJURIES TO POLES AM PIPES IN STREETS.
,Many states have !a,,.!s on their statute boohs which
make the theft of, or unlawful interference with, the pro-
perty of gas and electric light companies, in the streets,
serious offences. But in the case of injury to or interfer-
ence with, such property, any defense which might have been
interposed agaLst the city may be interposed against the
(a)
owner of the property.
TAXATION.
PERSONALTY OR REALTY - GAS PIP,S:-
The statutes cf :,a-, states prescribe the manner in
which the pipes of gas companies laid in the streets sha!1 be
assessed for purposes of taxation; thcat is, whether they
sha.ll be considered as realty or personalty. In the absence
of statute courts have reached directly opposite conclusions.
One view is that the pipes and mains so situated are appurt-
enances to the land upon which the gas works are situated,
(b) (c)
and hence are realty; or fixtures; or machinery forming part
of one great integral machine by .-.hich gas is manufactured
(d)
and distributed.
The other view is that the -2ipes do not become a
part of the realty, nor the property of the city in whose
(a) Roche v. Iilwaukee G. L. Co., 5 'is. 55.
(b) Capitol City G. L. Co. v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 51 Ia. 31.
(c) Providence G. Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. 1. 15.
(d) Commonwealth v. Lowell G. L. Co., 12 Allen 75.
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streets they are laid, but the: are personalty and re:rain the
(a)
property of the company. :hey cannot be considered as real
estate as they are not on orner's land, nor are they fix-
(b)
tures.
POLES AD VIRES:-
The taxation of poles and wires, in streets, like
that of gas pipes, is frequently regulated by statute,- many,
if not all of the statutes direct that the poles aind wires
shall be assessed as personalty. No adjudications of the
matter upon common law principles have been found. The poles
and wires have, however, been adjudged, under the doctrine of
constructive annexation, to be fixtures, belonging to the
electric light plant, and thus subject to liens attaching to
(c)
real estate.
MUNICIPAL TAX ON POLES:-
A city may impose a license fee upon the poles
erected in its streets for ti e purpose of defraying the ex-
penses of inspecting them. This is a legitimate exercise of
(d)
its police powers, designed for the safety of the public.
And it may require the poles to be numbered aid marked with
(e)
the initials of the owner. But tkhe license must be reasonable
(a) Memphis G. L. Co. v. State, 6 Coldwell 310.
(b) People v. Board of Assessors, 39 Ii. Y. 87.
But the mains, tanks and service pipes of a foreign gas
company are taxable as real estate under New York statute,
People v. Martin, A Hun 193.
(c) Badger Lumber Co. v. Marion etc. P. Co., 48 Kas. 182;
Keating Irap. Co. v. Power Co., 74 Tex. 605.
(d) Lancaster v. Edison E. Ill. Co., q Pa. Co. Ct. R. 178; W.
U. T. Co. v. Cit, of Philadelphia, ...At. CPenn.)144
City of Allentown v. WT. U. T. Co., 14 Pa. St. 117; City
of Chester v. P. R. & P. Co., 148 Pa. St. 120; contra,-
City of New Orleans v. G. S. T. & T. Co., 3 So. Rep. 533,
La. 1888.
in amount and not greater than the actual cost of the in-
spection, and it is not permissible to charge a fee in excess
of such cost in order to accumulate a fund for the purpose
of satisfying rossible damages for which the city may become
(a)
liable by reason of the presence of the poles in the streets.
Yet it is valid for a city, witi; ar exceptionally liberal
c'arter in regard to the control of the streets, to levy an
annual charge upon the poles in the streets, which is in the
(b)
nature of a rental for the portions of the streets occupied.
(a) City of Philadelphia v. !'. U. T. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 615.
(b) St. Louis v. W. U. 2. Co., 149 U. S. 463.

